Climate change in modern science and Vedic Science (Part 1)

I have argued in a series of recent postings that the success of the international response to the challenge of climate change is likely to be determined not primarily by technological but by human factors.

The modern disciplines have delivered us an understanding of physical laws and their application in technology (delivering also, we should note, the inevitable side-effects, such as those of the internal combustion engine, which are in large part responsible for the present crisis). These disciplines have been far less successful, however, in understanding individual and collective human functioning. Thus almost all of the suffering now evident across the world , from poverty to religious, tribal, ideological and ethnic violence, can be seen as having its roots in our lack of knowledge of how to handle individual and collective life for peace and progress.

That gap of knowledge looms increasingly large. Without a way of understanding how individuals, and collections of individuals such as communities and, think and act climate change cannot be effectively addressed, certainly not within the timelines climate science is now projecting. It is clear that new knowledge is urgently needed.

In this context I want to argue in this essay for the central relevance of the ancient Vedic Science, revived and presented to this time by the great Vedic scholar and teacher Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. I will argue that Maharishi Vedic Science (MVS) contains a radically new (to this time) and comprehensive account of human functioning, both individual and collective levels, which has been validated by a five-decade scientific research program and which has demonstrated its applied effectiveness at both levels. This program offers hope that the action required of the world community to avoid dangerous climate change can be achieved, and that a new platform for an orderly, balanced and compassionate world can systematically be put in place.

I will begin by reviewing some important implications of the current state of climate science and economics. I will argue that from this modelling can be derived requirements for the form of the knowledge needed to fill the knowledge gap. I will then outline the main principles of MVS and discuss its unique effectiveness in meeting these requirements and, further, in expanding their scope.

Under the Flannery/Hanson approach, the technological strategies required to address climate change are relatively clear: reduce GHG emissions through technologies such as clean coal and pyrolysis, and economic instruments such as emissions trading or taxes; develop renewable energy alternatives, through wind, solar and geothermal technologies; and lower existing CO2 levels in the atmosphere by eliminating deforestation and by undertaking massive reafforestation, particularly, for both, in the tropics.

The reductions that must be achieved by these strategies, however, now appear uncompromisingly large: far from the 20-40% by 2020, 60-90% by 2050 that represent the upper range of international aspirations, it is now becoming clear that a more realistic figure is reductions of 3% per year, starting in 2010, if dangerous climate change is to be avoided. Or, going by the study I cited in another recent post, since significant investment in technology–that is to say, renewable energy technology–implies a massive amount of embedded energy and the spike in emissions that would produce, after peaking in about five years emissions may need to be reduced by 5%-8% per year without much technological support.

Some important implications emerge from these analyses.

First, it is becoming clear that the global economy, which on the face of it is the primary driver of climate change, cannot be considered in isolation from its underpinnings in the global environment. Economic theory has been mounted largely without consideration of this fact; a recognition which lead Nicholas Stern to describe climate change as the largest market failure in human history. The reality now emerging—in the climate modelling of the IPCC and in the economic modelling of Stern, Garnaut and others—is that the global economy is part of a system which is composed of physical, biological and human components, which are inseparable, interacting at all levels. It is not possible to handle one part of the system which out handling all parts—without handling the system as a whole.

Yet ‘handling’, with its scientific and technological associations, founders on the extent of our profound ignorance. Each of these sub-systems is unimaginably complex in itself, let alone in combination with each other. The physical models that attempt to capture the complexity, chaotic behaviour and non-linearity of the earth’s physical climate systems are still in their infancy, hardly more than a decade old, dependent critically on advances in supercomputing. And the biological systems, particularly at the community ecology level, on which climate change impacts, are still not well understood or modelled. Add the kinds of interlinkages and feedback mechanisms of the earth systems, such as those described by David Beerling, which are already exhibiting their power in radically compressing the predicted timelines of the IPCC models, and the severe constraints under which modern scientific knowledge is operating becomes evident.

On the human side, economic models are built on simplifying assumptions to allow for mathematical manipulation: they don’t model the real economy in all its complexity, nor provide either full understanding of it or reliable means of intervening in it—as witness the 2008 collapse of the financial markets. Even more elementary are the sociological, political and cultural models which attempt to frame the dynamics of human society: there are strongly opposed positions, about philosophy, methodology and ideology, among other things, let alone any outcomes of research programs, which render theory and application fragile—as witness the crises of Africa and the developing nations and the foundering of the world program to eliminate poverty. We are hardly in a position to understand the impacts of climate change on human society, or ways in which mitigation and adaptation can be systematically developed, let alone prevent it. We don’t even have a formal model of what a low carbon economy and society might look like.

Second, emissions reductions of the order described above will require a collective mobilisation of the resources of nations that is without parallel in human history. The peoples and economies of every nation will have to participate fully. The required restructuring of each national economy, and of the global economy as a whole, is unprecedented. The world community will need to develop a comprehensive ground of common intention and action, embedded in global institutions of cooperation, that has not been even approached before. The mechanisms and institutions of the United Nations, while relatively effective in the exchange and dissemination of knowledge, have largely broken down on competitive issues, such as those relating to resources and national sovereignty. Major international initiatives, such as the rebuilding of Europe after World War II, or the humanitarian response to the Asian tsunami, or responses to pandemics, have been limited in scope and degree of participation, and in duration. With climate change, none of these limitations apply: no nation can stand outside the global initiative; all dimensions of the material foundations of societies are affected; and the time period is immediate and open-ended—simply, the future.

Third, as has been noted in other postings, the demand side of the equation is as critical as the supply side. Moderating consumption is the first strategy: meeting the energy demands necessary to fuel it, the second. We have already seen the effect of over-consumption on the global financial markets. The fact that the US produces 25% of the world’s production but consumes 35% of the world’s consumption demonstrates a fundamental instability: consumption is unsustainable with respect to the debt levels that support it. But current levels of consumption are also unsustainable with respect to their resource base and the environmental services that support it. It is now clear that the direct and delayed (embedded) GHG emissions are overloading the assimilative capacity of the global atmospheric system—with all the threats to the earth’s human and biological systems that are emerging from the physical and economic modelling. The logic, therefore, is clear: global consumption must be moderated; or at least reconfigured to place less burden on the resource base. If it does not, even the technological initiatives on the energy supply side seem likely to be overwhelmed by population growth continuing to drive emissions growth.

The idea of moderating consumption, however, is challenging to modern views of the individual and society. Modern microeconomics is built on the assumed nexus between individual preferences, utilities and satisfactions. Indeed, it is a fundamental assumption of preference and choice theory that more of a commodity, or of a bundle of commodities, is always to be preferred to less. The link to well-being is easy to make: more consumption is preferred because it provides greater levels of satisfaction, and hence well-being.

At the macroeconomic level the link between national consumption and national prosperity is held to be even more direct. Consumption is to drive demand for goods and services, which is to be met by increased economic activity, with its flow-on to employment, salaries and wages and purchasing power; a virtuous cycle, as it would appear. To consume becomes a patriotic duty; as, indeed, the Australian government has recently argued.

Yet surely these ways of thinking about consumption are transparently limited. For one thing there is abundant evidence that rising levels of consumption are not inexorably coupled with increases in well-being. In his Growth Fetish,Clive Hamilton summarises the research on this proposed link as follows:

“. . above a certain level of national income people in richer countries are no happier than people in poorer countries; in any given country rich people are no happier than those with moderate incomes; and as people become richer they do not become happier.”

The caveat, of course, relates to the two billion people who live on or below the poverty line: more income clearly matters if you are without adequate food, shelter, medical care, and the basic necessaries of life. One would not want in any way to undermine the legitimate claims of people in poverty for a proper material basis for their lives: this is a basic, non-negotiable level of human dignity. But once that level of support is in place increased consumption does not necessarily, or even probably, increase well-being: it may, in fact decrease it. The Australian researcher on well-being Richard Eckersley quotes American research to this effect:

“. . .materialism breeds not happiness but dissatisfaction, depression, anxiety, anger, isolation and alienation. Materialistic values go hand in hand with poor psychological health. Human needs for security and safety, competence and self-esteem, connectedness to others, and autonomy and authenticity are relatively unsatisfied when materialistic values predominate. These values also work against the well-being of other people, society and the planet. In short, the more materialistic we are, the poorer our quality of life.”

Moreover there is little doubt that the current levels of human consumption far exceed the natural resources of the planet available to support it. It has been estimated that over the last four decades human demand for resources has increased from 70% of the ability of the earth’s natural systems to absorb and regenerate, to 120%. Human populations, in other words, have been for some time drawing down the natural capital that sustains them. If one projects over the next century the accelerated consumption demanded by developing nations such as China and India to bring their people out of centuries of disabling poverty the equation becomes exponentially worse. One is compelled, under current assumptions about the nexus between consumption and quality of life, to consider searching for additional planets which would be needed to support such consumption. Yet it is difficult to deny the legitimacy of this demand, mounted on equity grounds. The realities of climate change have, of course, presented these contradictions in stark form. A new way of looking at the entire economy-environment system in the context of international equity is evidently urgently required.

This line of reasoning implies that the demand side of the equation can be handled by moderating consumption—indeed, there is every reason to seek it. That, however, requires a very different view of well-being, both individual and collective, and of the physical, social and economic conditions that are needed to secure it.

The form and characteristics of the new knowledge required to meet the challenge of dangerous climate change now begin to take form.

First, it must be knowledge that is centrally concerned with the relationship between the global physical, biological and human systems; with the form and functioning of the meta-system of which they are components, and with the higher order principles or laws which govern it. This requirement carries the implication that it must be ordered knowledge, where theory can be systematically developed, validated and applied to improve the integrated outcomes that are needed to combat climate change.

Second, it must be knowledge that yields a new and comprehensive insight into the nature of collective human life and living, at all scales, from local communities, to nations, to the global community of nations. Again, it must be knowledge that contains within its scope systematic application to generate the conditions of shared values and common purposes necessary for effective international action on climate change. These values and purposes must transcend the boundaries of particular societies and cultures while supporting their independent integrity. Most importantly, these shared values and common purposes must flow through into stable international institutions for handling climate change that are secured by the firm commitment of all nation states. Further, they must underpin economic and social forms that thrive under the low carbon conditions of effective climate change response.

Third, it must be knowledge that addresses and fulfils the universal demand for a life of true well-being, free of suffering and, on individual and collective levels, able to grow in increasing richness of human potentiality towards real fulfillment. In particular, it must show that human life can be lived in such abundance under conditions of less material consumption, and that happiness is not dependent on such consumption.

Such is the surprising conclusion of the analysis so far. It is surprising because it seems an inconceivable demand. Yet I suggest that there can be no resiling from these conclusions: so far the history of rapidly accelerating climate change and of humanity’s wholly inadequate response to it makes it clear that anything less will not be enough. If this pattern continues we will see in our lifetimes immeasurable suffering, mainly among the poor of the world—what to say of the lifetimes of future generations. There is no other choice but to look at the realities and act.

Of these realities, the most immediate is this: it needs to be recognised once and for all that the modern disciplines of knowledge, while delivering some partial insights into elements of this complex challenge, appear incapable of grasping the whole in the way we have concluded is required if dangerous climate change is to be avoided. New knowledge is urgently needed.

I will argue that, very fortunately, this knowledge is available: it only needs to be diligently applied. It is new and radically challenging to the Western developed world. Yet it has roots of immeasurable antiquity, repeatedly authenticated over time and again confirmed over the past fifty years under the rigorous scrutiny of modern science. This is the domain of Maharishi Vedic Science, to which we now turn.

Geoff Wells

Dr Geoff Wells is an internationally experienced corporate leader and consultant. After doctoral work in social science and business experience in Australia, he worked for 15 years, through the 80’s and 90’s, in the United States. He has founded and managed companies in a range of industries, including corporate sustainability, sustainable agribusiness, molecular biology and telecommunications. He has consulted widely in both countries as a corporate advisor to CEO’s and Boards of Directors, in strategy development, strategic financial modelling, organisational development, leadership and governance.

Geoff has researched and taught in a number of universities. He is currently academic director of the new graduate program in Sustainable Business at the International Graduate School of Business, University of South Australia. He is an active researcher in sustainble business through UniSA’s Sustainable Communities Research & Innovation Cluster. In 2006 he was awarded the IGSB Inaugural Excellence in Teaching Award for his teaching in the School’s leadership and organisational development programs, at the MBA and DBA levels. He has also been Executive-in-Residence, Flinders University, South Australia; and Professor and Dean at Maharishi University of Management, Fairfield, Iowa, USA, an innovative and highly-accredited institution with students from over 50 countries.

Geoff is an experienced mentor and a much-demanded speaker and presenter to groups of CEO’s throughout Australia. Geoff provides ESG (environmental, social and governance) sustainability advice to major international corporations and organisations in both the private and public sectors. He has pioneered the application of valuation techniques to sustainability challenges in companies and for governments. Recently he was invited to present a keynote address on sustainable investment to the Melbourne Financial Services Symposium, a technical Forum on carbon valuation to the Melbourne Centre for Financial Studies, and a presentation on managing under climate change to the Beyond Carbon state conference of local government in Adelaide.

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